CASE NO.	_08cu	1589
ATTACHME	NT NO	10
EXHIBIT _		
TAB (DESCRIPTIO	) ( NO	

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Did	you	understand	his	question?
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THE WITNESS: There is always a lot of people out there.

MR. RONKOWSKI: Q How many people were out there, in front of your house, when the police were there?

MS. PLACEK: Objection, presuming.

THE COURT: Overruled.

MR. RONKOWSKI: Q How many?

- A No one was in front of our house.
- Q You are not saying there was quite a few people out?
  - A They were just in the area, in the neighborhood.
- Q How many people out in front of your house, in the area?
- A No one was in front of our house. The people were like across the street, on the corners.
  - Q How many people?
  - A I didn't count heads.
  - Q Hundreds?
  - A No.
  - Q Dozens?
  - A A few.
  - Q Twenty to 30?
  - A I don't even think it was that many.

1	Q Would you say there was quite a few people
2	across the street?
3	MS. PLACEK: Well, Judge, again, I am going to
4	object.
5	THE COURT: The objection is sustained.
6	MR. RONKOWSKI: Q Now, you are saying that the
7	police handcuffed your brother inside the house?
8	A Yes.
9.	Q Did they do anything, other than handcuffing
10	the police in handcuffing your brother inside the
11	house?
12	A No.
13	Q And all four of these officers were in
14	uniform?
15	A No. Two were in uniform.
16	Q And two were in plainclothes?
17	A Yes.
18	Q Was the lady in uniform or in plainclothes?
19	A Uniform.
20	Q Where were those two officers?
21	A They were inside the house.
22	Q Now, when you said the police rang the door-
23	bell, how long before they entered the house?
	A A few seconds. We were right there at the

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ı	door.
2	Q Did you hold the door open for them?
3	A We opened the door and they came in.
4	Q And who was the person that opened the door
5	for the police, after they rang the doorbell?
6	A Myself.
7	Q Did you have a conversation with the police
8	at that time or did you just let them in?
9	A I just let them in.
10	Q When you opened the door for the police,
11	did you see those people outside and across the street?
12	A Yes.
13	MS. PLACEK: Well, Judge, the witness spoke of
14	people hanging out in the neighborhood.
15	THE COURT: Those are the people she saw outside,
16	across the street. The answer will stand. Your objection
17	is overruled.
18	MR. RONKOWSKI: Q Did you recognize any of them?
19	A I know the people.
20	Q Who are they?
21	A My neighbors.

When you say kids, how old are they?

Do you know any of their names?

They were kids.

Yes.

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	A Fifteen, 16.
	Q Anybody older than that?
	A I don't know their ages, all their ages.
	Q And when you opened the door to allow the
	police in, how many kids did you see out in front of
	your house?
	MS. PLACEK: Judge, again, that's a misstatement
	of the evidence.
	THE COURT: The objection is sustained.
	MR. RONKOWSKI: Q How many people were out there?
ļ.	A They were across the street. It was a tavern
	across the street. People hang in front of it.
	Q Listen to the question.
	How many people were out there when you
	opened the door to the police?
	MS. PLACEK: Judge, we have been through this
	three times, with the State.
	MR. RONKOWSKI: I haven't got an answer, how many.
	MS. PLACEK: Just asked and answered.
	THE COURT: Overruled.
	Do you know how many people were there?
	THE WITNESS: No.
	THE COURT: Put another question.
	MR. RONKOWSKI: Q Was there more than 20?

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1	MS. PLACEK: Judge, again,
	THE COURT: Overruled.
2	THE WITNESS: I don't think so.
3	MR. RONKOWSKI: Q Was there more than ten?
4	A It may have been about the number.
5	Q Is this the crowd that diminished after the
6	police transported your brother from that scene?
7	A The crowd had diminished.
8	
9	Q How many, how big did that crowd get at its
10	peak.
11	MS. PLACEK: Objection, Judge.
12	THE COURT: Overruled.
13	To the characterization of crowd, I will
14	sustain that objection. There were people out in the
15	street.
16	At the maximum, how many people did you
17	see?
18	THE WITNESS: About eight or nine.
19	THE COURT: Put another question, please.
	MR. RONKOWSKI: Q Where was your mother when you
20	opened the door for the police?
21	A In the living room.
22	Q Who else was in the living room?
23	
	A Jerome.

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1	Q	Anybody else?
2	A	Our neighbor.
3	Q	What is your neighbor's name?
4	A	Maria.
5	Q	What is her last name?
6	A	Fields.
7	Q	Anybody else?
8	A	No; that I remember.
9	Q	What was your brother doing when you opened
10	the door	for the police?
11	A	He was still on the phone with my sister.
12	Q	Did he hang up the phone then, when the police
13	came in?	
14	A	He was still talking to her.
15	Q	Well, didn't he get off the phone when the
16	police wa	alked up to him?
17	A	When they walked up to him, yes, he got off.
18	Q	Did the police have a conversation with your
19	brother?	
20	A	Not that I recall.
21	Q	Did your brother say anything to the police?
22	A	Not that I recall.
23	Q	And the police immediately left with your
24	brother?	
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1	A	Yes.
2	Q	They were in your home for just a few seconds
3	then?	
4	A	Yes.
5	Q	Now, did you see your brother's wrist?
6	<b>A</b> .	Yes.
7	Q	And was your brother handcuffed while he was
8	in your h	ouse?
9	A	Yes.
10	Q	Was he handcuffed in front of him or behind
11	him?	
12	A	Behind him.
13	Q	Did all four of these police officers exit
14	at the sa	me time?
15	A	Yes.
16	Q	And did they enter at the same time?
17	A	No.
18	Q	Which two entered first?
19	A	The plainclothesmen.
20	Q	How long after they had entered did these
21	uniformed	i officers enter?
22	A	A few seconds.
23		RONKOWSKI: If I could have a moment, your
	Honor.	

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THE COURT: Redirect.

MS. PLACEK: Very briefly.

### REDIRECT EXAMINATION

# BY MS. PLACEK:

Q Ma'am, when the Assistant State's Attorney was asking you questions about the number of people, that was the average number of people that was always at that tavern, correct, in front of that tavern, across your house, correct?

- A More or less.
- Q Beg your pardon?
- A More or less.
- You saw nothing unusual about that, correct?
- A No.
- Q They weren't screaming at your brother?
- A No.
- Q They weren't screaming at your house?
- A No.
- Q They weren't screaming before the police came, were they?
  - A No.
  - Q They weren't screaming after the police came?

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1	A No.
2	MS. PLACEK: Thank you.
3	That's all, judge.
4	THE COURT: Recross.
5	RECROSS EXAMINATION
6	BY MR. RONKOWSKI:
7	
8	Q Of those people there, the most that was
9	there was nine?
10	MS. PLACEK: Judge, we went through this as to
11	number.
12	MR. RONKOWSKI: Foundation for the next series
13	of questions.
14	THE COURT: Put your next series of questions.
15	Objection sustained.
	MR. RONKOWSKI: Q Was the oldest person there
16	17?
17 18	MS. PLACEK: Objection. She said she didn't know.
19	THE COURT: Objection is sustained.
20	MR. RONKOWSKI: Q Did these kids that you say
21	were out in front of your house, did they all come out
~1	of the tavern?

MS. PLACEK: Objection again, out in front of your house. We have been through this three times. It

1	isn't going to change.
2	THE COURT: Out in front of the house is stricken.
3	They're in the area.
4	Did they all come out of the tavern, if
5	you know?
6	THE WITNESS: No. They were just really hanging
7	around the tavern, outside the door.
8	THE COURT: Put another question.
9	MR. RONKOWSKI: Q How many people came out of
10	the tavern?
11	MS. PLACEK: Judge, there was never any evidence.
12	THE COURT: Overruled. If she knows, she may
13	answer.
14	THE WITNESS: I didn't see them coming out. They
15	were just hanging around the tavern door. I didn't see
16	them go in or come out.
17	MR. RONKOWSKI: Nothing further.
18	MS. PLACEK: Nothing further, your Honor. Thank
19	you.
20	THE COURT: Thank you, ma'am. You may also remain
21	in the courtroom, if you so desire.
22	(Witness excused.)
23	
	(Without duly grown )

THE	COURT:	Ma'am,	that microphone is on.	Ιf
you will	draw up	close,	speak directly into it,	keep
vour voi	ce up, w	e'll al	l be able to hear you.	

MS. PLACEK: May I proceed?

THE COURT: You may.

# EARLINE HENDRICKS,

called as a witness on behalf of the Petitioner-Defendant herein, having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

#### DIRECT EXAMINATION

### BY MS. PLACEK:

Q Ma'am, would you state your first and last name, spelling both for the purposes of the record.

A My name is Earline Hendricks, E-a-r-l-i-n-e, Hendricks, H-e-n-d-r-i-c-k-s.

- Q Now, ma'am, you are the mother of Jerome Hendricks?
  - A Iam.
- Q And calling your attention to 1988, approximately August 9, was he living with you?
  - A Yes, he was.
- Q Now, calling your attention to the afternoon hours, early evening hours, did you know where Jerome

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Α	Нe	had	been	out	looking	for	а	job.
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Q Now, you say he was out looking for a job. From that job, did he have — or from that task, did he have occasion to come back home?

A Yes, he did.

Q Could you tell his Honor, Judge Holt, at approximately what time he came home?

A I guess, about between 7:30 and 8:00 o'clock, around there.

Q Now, at that time, did you have a conversation with your son?

A Yes, I did.

Q Could you tell his Honor, Judge Holt, what that conversation consisted of?

MR. RONKOWSKI: Objection.

THE COURT: Overruled. Hearsay is the basis of the objection?

MR. RONKOWSKI: The fact that what she says is irrelevant, unless the defendant relies on it. The defendant hasn't testified to any of this.

THE COURT: Overruled.

MS. PLACEK: Judge --

Q Well, go on, ma'am, I'm sorry.

A Well, when Jerome	e came in, I told him that
the police was there and the	hey left me a card and asked
me to call asked him to	call when he comes in.
Q Now, let's talk	a bit about the police. When
were the police there?	
A They were there	earlier part of the day.
Q Do you remember	about what time?
A Well, it had to	be after I got off from work.
Q And could you so	rt ·
A About, I quess a	bout 4:30, 5:00 o'clock.

- A About, I guess about 4:30, 5:00 o cloc
- Q You worked that day, correct?
- A Yes, I did.
- Q Could you tell his Honor, Judge Holt, where you worked?
- A I worked at my -- Weiss Memorial Hospital, at 4646 Marine Drive.
  - Q What is your position at Weiss?
  - A I was cashier there.
  - Q Thank you.

Now, Ma'am, when you told Jerome that the police had come and asked him to call, did he, in fact, make a phone call?

- A Yes, he did.
- Q Did you see him make a phone call?

A Yes, I did.

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- Q And what, if anything unusual, happened after he made that phone call?
  - A Well, after he called the police, they came.
- Q When you say they, did you recognize those officers?
- A Well, it was four police that came, two in plainclothes and two in uniform.
  - Q Were they white or black?
  - A All of them were white.
  - Q Did you recognize any of them from previous?
  - A No, not really, no.
- Q And what, if anything unusual, happened at that time?
- A Well, after he called, it wasn't too long before they came, and they came and they rang the bell, and we opened the door and let them in, and they asked where was Jerome. As soon as they identified themselves, they took him and put handcuffs on him. I asked them why were they putting handcuffs on him, if they were just going to talk to him.
  - Q What did they say? .
- A They didn't say anything to me. They just took him on out. The lady police told me don't worry.

Now, ma'am, did you happen to see them when 1 they took him out of your house? 2 Yes, I did. 3 Was there a crowd screaming for Jerome's blood, Q 4 in your yard? 5 No. Α 6 Was there anyone throwing rocks or hitting him 7 with boards, in your yard? 8 Α No. 9 Did you see the police have to protect Jerome Q 10 in any way, shape, or manner, after they had arrested him? 11 No. Α 12 MS. PLACEK: Thank you, your Honor. That's all I 13 would have. 14 THE COURT: Cross. 15 16 CROSS EXAMINATION 17 BY MR. RONKOWSKI: 18 Ma'am, you were there when the police were let Q 19 in? 20 Yes, I was. A 21 Was it you or your daughter that opened the 22 door for the police? 23 I think it was my daughter, I disremember. A.

I '	m	not	su	re	•
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- Q That was after they rang the doorbell?
- A Yes.
- Q The police were inside only a matter of a few seconds, correct?
  - A Correct.
- Q When you opened the door, how many people could you see out in front of your house?

MS. PLACEK: Objection, presuming, Judge.

THE COURT: Overruled.

THE WITNESS: We could see out our door, because our front door was open and we had a screen door up, so we could see out all the time.

MR. RONKOWSKI: Q How many people did you see out there?

- A Nobody, really.
- Q The only people that were outside your house was the police, which you let in?
- A Well, I guess it was people out there, but they weren't around my house.
  - Q How many people could you see out there?
- MS. PLACEK: Well, Judge, again, there would be an objection as for clarification of the question.

THE COURT: Overruled. If she understands, she may



answer.

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THE WITNESS: You say how many people did I see out there. I really didn't pay any attention. It wasn't no mob or anything out there.

MR. RONKOWSKI: Q Where was the nearest person?

MS. PLACEK: Objection.

THE COURT: Overruled.

THE WITNESS: The nearest person, I don't know where the nearest person was, sir.

MR. RONKOWSKI: Q Now, the police left in a few seconds. Did you watch your son go with the police?

A Yes, I did.

Q Did you see anybody outside your house when your son left the house with the police?

A No, I didn't.

Q Were there any kids across the street?

MS. PLACEK: Objection.

THE COURT: Overruled.

THE WITNESS: I didn't pay any attention, sir, whether there were children across the street.

MR. RONKOWSKI: Q Well, could you see your son's wrists?

A I could see -- you mean when they take him to the police car?

1	Q	At any time after the police arrived, could
2	you view	your son's wrists?
3	A	His wrists?
4	Q	His wrists.
5	A	Yes, I could.
6	Q	Was there anything on it?
7	A	Handcuffs.
8	Q	How was he handcuffed?
9	A	In the back, they put his hands in back and
10	handcuffe	d him.
11	Q	Who did that to him?
12	, A	The police.
13	Q	Who was there when that happened?
14	A	My daughter and myself.
15	Q	Anybody else?
16	A	It was another lady named Marie was there.
17	Q	Do you know Marie's last name?
18	<b>A</b>	I don't know her last name.
19	. Q	Where does she live?
20	A	I don't really know where she lives at.
21	Q	How long have you known Marie?
22	A	She's not a friend of mine. She was a friend
23	of my dau	ghter's.
24	Q	What was your daughter's name that was present?

need be.

1	A Davida Hendricks.
2	Q Anybody besides you, your son, Maria, and
3	Davida?
4	A Was at the house?
5	Q Yes.
6	A That's all.
7	MR. RONKOWSKI: Nothing further.
8	MS. PLACEK: No rebuttal or redirect, your Honor.
9	THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Hendricks. You may ste
10	down.
11	MS. PLACEK: May she remain in the courtroom?
12	THE COURT: You may also remain in the courtroom,
13	if you so desire.
14	(Witness excused.)
15	MS. PLACEK: Your Honor, at this time, we would
16	rest in rebuttal.
17	THE COURT: Petitioner rests in rebuttal.
18	MR. RONKOWSKI: If I could have a brief recess
19	and get on the phone and check on Sergeant Wolf's
20	ability to testify.
21	MS. PLACEK: Is he on standby, your Honor?
22	MR. RONKOWSKI: He's been on standby for quite a
23	number of dates. I've got his home phone number, if

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i	MS. PLACEK: I would be real impressed if we knew
2	he was on standby, by phone, for today, instead of quite
3	a number.
4	THE COURT: I can't answer that.
5	MS. PLACEK: Thank you.
6	THE COURT: This case is recessed. We'll call it
7	back shortly.
8	(Whereupon, a short recess was
9	taken.)
10	THE CLERK: Jerome Hendricks.
11	MR. RONKOWSKI: We couldn't agree on a stipulation
12	and the officer is on his way here.
13	THE COURT: You could not agree on a stipulation,
14	you say?
15	MR. RONKOWSKI: Yes. There was an offer of a
16	stipulation that Detective
17	THE COURT: No. Do you have an agreement?
18	MR. RONKOWSKI: No.
19	MS. PLACEK: Judge, the stipulation
20	THE COURT: I am not interested in the contents
21	of the stipulation. I am only interested in whether or
22	not you and Mr. Ronkowski have agreed on a stipulation.

MS. PLACEK: I asked him to rethink, because he

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asked me to concur on what another officer testified
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      to as --
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           THE COURT: You are not answering my question.
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                      Do you have an agreement or don't you?
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           MS. PLACEK: If the State would offer me something,
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      Judge, we might.
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           THE COURT: Passed.
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                           (Whereupon, the above-entitled
                            cause was passed, after which
9
                            the following proceedings were
                            had:)
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                        Jerome Hendricks.
           THE CLERK:
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                           (Witness duly sworn.)
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           MR. RONKOWSKI:
                           May I proceed?
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           THE COURT: You may.
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### ALBERT WOLF,

called as a witness on behalf of the People of the State of Illinois-Respondent herein, having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

## DIRECT EXAMINATION

#### BY MR. RONKOWSKI:

- Q State your full name and spell your last name for the Court Reporter.
  - A Albert Wolf, W-o-l-f.
- Q How long have you been with the Chicago Police Department?
  - A Over 12 years.
  - Q What is your current rank?
  - A I am a sergeant.
- Q Now, referring your attention to August 8, 1988, where were you assigned?
- A Assigned as a detective in Area 2, Violent Crimes.
  - Q How long had you been a detective?
  - A I was promoted detective in November, 1981.
- Q Now, referring your attention to August 8, 1988, at about 8:30 p.m., were you in Area 2?
  - A Yes.
  - Q Who was your partner that day?

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1	A Larry Nitsche.
2	Q Did he receive a phone call?
3	A Yes, he did.
4	Q Pursuant to that phone call, did you go to a
5	location?
6	A Yes, we did.
7	Q Whose home was that?
8	A To the house of Jerome Hendricks, 255 West
9	117th Street.
10	Q Could you describe what you observed when you
11	arrived at that location on August 8, 1988?
12	A It was a very sizeable crowd, very unruly,
13	intense crowd, scattered about the street, the sidewalk,
14	in the vicinity of the house.
15	Q How many people in the crowd?
16	A Maybe two, three dozen.
17	Q What happened after you arrived there?
18	THE COURT: Mr. Ronkowski, what is the relevance
19	of this testimony?
20	MS. PLACEK: I was just going to object, Judge.
21	MR. RONKOWSKI: It goes toward the mode of why the
22	defendant would call the police and voluntarily go with
23	the police. It's the State's theory of the case.
24	Ms. PLACEK: Judge, this is improper. I'll make

1	the objection. It is improper for sufferential.
2	THE COURT: Overruled.
3	Go ahead.
4	MR. RONKOWSKI: Q What happened after you arrived
5	there?
6	A We exited our vehicle, walked through the
7	crowd and approached the front door of 255.
8	Q Then what happened?
9	A The front door was opened by a female and we
10	entered the house.
11	Q And what happened when you entered the house?
12	A We observed Jerome Hendricks on the telephone.
13	He observed us. He put the phone down. We told him we
14	were the detectives he had just called. He stated he
15	wished to cooperate with the police and come with us to
16	Area 2.
17	MS. PLACEK: There will be continuing objection,
18	Judge.
19	THE COURT: Objection is overruled.
20	MR. RONKOWSKI: Q When what happened?
21	A We walked out the front door and walked to our
22	squad car.
23	Q And did the defendant have a seat in your
24	squad car?
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1	A Yes. He opened the door and sat in the back
2	seat of the squad car.
3	Q Where was the group of people outside, at
4	that time?
5	A They were in very close proximity of our own
6	presence. They were all around.
7	Q Was the defendant handcuffed at any time?
8	A No.
9	MR. RONKOWSKI: Your witness.
10	CROSS EXAMINATION
11	BY MS. PLACEK:
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13	Q Officer, before you took the stand today,
14	you were in what is called a witness room outside of
15	this courtroom, correct?
16	A That's correct.
17	Q And, Officer, I'm going to ask you to speak
18	a little louder. I am deaf in this ear. Okay?
19	A Sure.
20	Q The microphone even works.
21	When you were speaking to Mr. Ronkowski,
22	he was showing you reports and you were discussing your
23	testimony, correct?
	3 Tues were suing my report

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To refresh your recollection, correct? Q 1 That's correct. Α 2 And in reviewing your report, in that report, Q 3 you never wrote any designation or any notation about 4 any kind of large crowd, did you? 5 A No. 6 Not only didn't you write any designation or 7 any sort of thing about any large crowd, but what you 8 told us today, from the stand, is what you're purporting 9

MR. RONKOWSKI: Objection, argumentative.

THE COURT: Overruled.

to say is what happened, correct?

MS. PLACEK: Q Correct?

A Exactly what happened.

Q Exactly what happened.

So nobody came from that crowd and hit the defendant on the head or tried to hit him with a stick or two-by-four, did they?

A There was -- I walked out the door first, walking to the car. The crowd was all around us. It was a very intense, volatile crowd. There was some kind of physical scuffle. I do not know what that involved.

Q By the way, when you say you don't know that that involved, you were with the defendant, weren't you?

1	A Pardon me?
2	Q You were with the defendant, weren't you?
3	A I was walking first.
4	Q So you didn't turn around when this crowd
5	attacked the defendant, you just kept walking forward?
6	A We moved quickly through the crowd.
7	Q By the way, that little part you had just
8	added, did I refresh your memory or did you just come
9	up with that?
10	A I have a distinct recollection.
11	MR. RONKOWSKI: Objection.
12	MS. PLACEK: If I could finish I'll withdraw it,
13	Judge.
14	Q You, when Mr. Ronkowski asked you
15	what happened, you didn't mention about anybody hitting
16	the defendant with anything, or any sort of confronta-
17	tion, attacking the defendant, did you?
18	A I relayed the same facts to Mr. Ronkowski
19	that I am to you.
20	Q So in other words, you said, on direct
21	examination, about these people attacking the defendant?
22	A I have
23	MR. RONKOWSKI: Objection.
24	THE COURT: The objection is sustained. It is

argumen	tat	iv	e.
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MS. PLACEK: Q By the way, there is nothing in your report about the crowd getting unruly and moving in, correct?

- A That's correct.
- Q Thank you.

By the way, it is standard Chicago operating, or standard procedure for the Chicago Police Department to put all those things that are important or vital or out of the ordinary in Chicago Police reports, correct?

A Police reports is a summary of the facts of the investigation.

- Q Did you understand my question, Officer?
- A I certainly understand it.
- Q Would you answer it?

A That case report is a summary of the facts our investigation revealed and indicates, that report indicates facts pertinent to the investigation.

Q So there was nothing pertinent about a large crowd of people attacking the defendant?

A Unfortunately, I am not the one who authored the report.

Q Did you offer to change it?

Į.	
1	A No, I did not.
2	Q Have you ever said to your partner, let's
3	change that report, let's make it correct?
4	A No, I did not.
5	Q I see.
	By the way, there were people in the
6 7	house with the defendant, weren't there?
	A Yes.
8	Q His mother?
9	A Yes.
10	Q His sister?
11	A Several family members. I don't recall if
12	his sister or not.
13	Q Could you recognize them?
14	A No.
15	Q Look around the courtroom and see if you see
16	them.
17	MR.RONKOWSKI: Objection.
18	THE COURT: Overruled.
19	THE WITNESS: I have already answered.
20	MS. PLACEK: Q So in other words, you can't
21	remember whether what his mother or his sister looked
22	like, correct?
23	A At this point, I would be guessing. I choose
24	A AC CHIE POINT, I Would be guodeling. I entered

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Q	Thank	you.
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Officer, isn't it true that you went st the defendant?

it's not.

't it true there is nothing about this , because of this impending crowd, in olice reports?

elieve you already asked me that. the report about the crowd.

the call for help to the station by the the Chicago Police Department report,

don't know what call for help you are

Exactly. Thank you. CEK:

That's all, Judge.

Redirect. : T5

### REDIRECT EXAMINATION

### BY MR. RONKOWSKI:

- ur police reports show that the defendant 8:30, on August 8, doesn't it?
  - Called our station to let us know he was at

1	home, to speak to us.
2	Q You are working with other detectives?
3	A Numerous.
4	Q And other detectives were at the scene?
5	A Yes.
6	MR. RONKOWSKI: Nothing further.
7	RECROSS EXAMINATION
8	BY MS. PLACEK:
9	
10	Q What other detectives?
11	A Detective Baker was on the scene, whoever Baker
12	was working with.
13	Q By the way, you did refresh your recollection
14	as to who was present at the scene, when you read the
15	reports, didn't you?
16	A I have a distinct recollection of that scene.
17	Q Then name your brother officers who were
18	present at that scene.
19	A I'm telling you Baker was there. I don't
20	recall if Baker was with anybody. There were several.
21	Q I beg your pardon, I missed the last part,
22	who was with Baker?
22	A I don't recall if Baker was with somebody.

It's possibly Ryan was there.

1	Q Possible. Does that mean he may not have
2	been there?
3	A I don't know for sure. I know Baker was
4	there.
5	MS. PLACEK: Thank you.
6	That's all, Judge.
7	MR. RONKOWSKI: Nothing further by the State.
8	
9	EXAMINATION
10	BY THE COURT:
11	Q Mr. Wolf, from the date of this arrest, down
12	to and including today's date, have you authored any
13	police reports in this case?
14	A Official police reports, Judge, or talking
15	about notes?
16	Q Notes.
17	A Yes.
18	Q Authored reports or any other thing in writing
19	that memorializes the events of that day?
20	A I have made notes regarding this case. I
21	did not make a formal police report.
22	Q Is there any note, document, or report, or
23	anything else, in writing, prepared by you, that
24	describes or comments upon this crowd that you say was

out in	front of t	he defen	dant's l	ouse?			
A	I would	have to	review	all of	the	notes,	your

Honor. None come to my recollection.

Q Was anyone arrested for mob action or any other offense out in front of the defendant's house?

A No.

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Q Have you read any police reports authored by any other officer in this case that would mention the crowd that you say was out in front of the defendant's house?

A None that I recall.

Q Is there any report that indicates that when the defendant called the police station, he mentioned anything about a crowd gathered in front of his home?

A None that I know of.

THE COURT: Mr. Ronkowski.

MR. RONKOWSKI: If I could have a moment.

Nothing further.

MS. PLACEK: Nothing further, Judge.

### FURTHER EXAMINATION

#### BY THE COURT:

Q Let me ask you, Mr. Wolf, do I understand correctly, that the defendant requested the police

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department	to	transport	him	to	a	police	facility
because of	thi	is crowd?					

A Why he did what he did, I don't know. I can only tell you what happened.

Q Did he say that, you know, any words to that effect?

A He didn't come out and say it. I think that the environment -- I don't know. I didn't tell him why he did what he did.

Q What, if anything, did the police department do to protect the other members of Mr. Hendricks' family, who remained in the house?

A I'm not aware of that.

Q So the police just took Mr. Hendricks and all the police officers there left?

A Mr. Hendricks, when he called us, when I approached him at his house, he did not convey to me that he was in fear of this crowd, that that was his main concern. His main concern was that he was innocent and he wanted to cooperate.

Q I understand, but when you say this crowd out in front of his house, you recognized that there was danger, perhaps, to Mr. Hendricks, did you?

A It was a tense situation. How far the crowd

Mr. Hendricks?

was going	g to go,	I don't	know.	We had	ample	police
officers	on the	scene, to	o contro	ol the	situat	ion.
Q	All th	e police	office	rs left	with	

A I can only tell you what I did. I don't know how long uniformed policemen stayed behind.

Q But before you and the police officers, who arrived at his home with you, left, nothing was done to secure the person of the other people remaining at the home, is that right?

A No, that I am aware of. I immediately left the scene.

THE COURT: Mr. Ronkowski?

MR. RONKOWSKI: Nothing further.

THE COURT: Ms. Placek?

### FURTHER RECROSS EXAMINATION

#### BY Ms. PLACEK:

Q Because of impending danger presented by this crowd, did you ever speak to either the defendant's mother or sister, or any other member of that household?

A We were only in the house a very brief amount of time.

Q Does that mean no, you didn't?

- A Are you talking about when we took him?
- Q When you took him into custody, yes.

MS. MALLO: Objection.

THE COURT: Overruled.

THE WITNESS: I don't recall.

MS. PLACEK: Q Do you recall whether or not anybody, when you took the defendant into custody, asked the mother or the sister or anyone else present in that household, whether they might want to come along for their own personal safety?

MS. MALLO: Objection.

MR. RONKOWSKI: Objection. Assumes a fact not in evidence.

THE COURT: Overruled.

THE WITNESS: The subject was not taken into custody. He agreed to accompany us. We left the scene. I do not recall any conversation with the mother at that time.

MS PLACEK: Q Or sister?

- A Or sister.
- Q Or any other member of the household?
- A Well, people were there, things were happening.
  You're asking me for a verbatim account of conversation,
  I cannot give it to you.
  - Q Let me ask you, in your account, what was done

members, and

1	to secure the safety of other members of the household
2	and the children?
3	A Again, I can only state what I did and what
4	I am aware of.
5	Q What did you do to secure the safety of the
6	house and the mother, sister, other female members, and
7	the children in the household?
8	A Nothing.
9	MS. PLACEK: Thank you.
10	That's all, Judge.
11	THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Wolf. You may step
12	down.
13	
14	(Witness excused.)
15	MR. RONKOWSKI: The People rest.
16	THE COURT: Both sides rest?
17	MS. PLACEK: Yes, Judge.
18	THE COURT: I'll hear argument.
19	THE COURT: You may.
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### OPENING ARGUMENT

### BY MS. PLACEK:

Your Honor, in this particular matter,
I won't be so bold, nor am I that young in the law
to cite the certain basic provisions of the United
States Constitution, all which have been trampled on
by, in fact, the police in this issue.

In trying to prepare this argument,
quite frankly, I have been trying to figure out what
exactly the theory of the probable cause or the
legitimacy of this arrest is and, quite frankly, I have
searched and I have searched in the light most favorable
to the State and found none.

If this does not fall into a classic situation of Payton and its prodigies, then no other case can.

Number one, the suggestion -- well, strike that.

The State, in their answer to our case, has never shown you a defendant, who the police were afraid of fleeing. They never showed any exigent circumstances that, in fact, would have prevented the police from going into this man's house, into this man's residence, without a warrant, serving it on this man and,

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in fact, executing a proper arrest.

Since we are starting with a warrantless arrest, the idea becomes then what probable cause or what emergency did they have and what was presented to you. Quite frankly, the State will say, Judge, this is not an arrest at this time. Quite frankly, what we have before the Court is we have, in fact, a consentual situation. After all, what you have is you have a consent of the mother and the sister, you have the consent of, supposedly, the defendant to go with them.

We point out that the prodigy of Payton says the police can't use deception and in the use of deception, quite frankly, all consent, is any, is vitiated. In this case, there is no consent, because even if you place the arrest at a later time, no evidence has been introduced to the State that their case got any better.

First, let's deal with the situation at the house. All of a sudden, out of thin air, the State would have you believe in the evidence, to their best light, that, in fact, this gentleman either called the police because he felt threatened by a crowd in the neighborhood, which the Court very kindly pointed out in all the parade of officers that we had, that the

police didn't even note any kind of crowd threatening the defendant. And we would point out that this becomes more than a mere situation where, well, it wasn't really that important, we handled the situation, for the simple reason that this could have been used at trial by these police officers, against the defendant. What would be more damaging, and this is why it should have been, if it happened the way it was, it should have been in their police reports, than tell you, Judge, or 12 members of the jury, my, God, we were the protectors of this man. We saved him because the neighborhood knew he did it. It never happened.

You heard officer upon officer, and one relative of the victim, who comes supposedly forward, a day after — a date, rather, after the motions have began, and said yes, I was part of the crowd, and none of the other police officers know his name, nor is there any reason for him to come forward, other than a cross examination of police officers, in the previous date, by Defense Counsel.

Next, you have the credibility of police officers. Well, we went in there and we said come with us, son, and he came willingly. Well, did he? We stand unimpeached by the family members and by his own testi-

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mony that, quite frankly, that they came in and when they came in, they grabbed him and handcuffed and took him out, and that's when the arrest took place. And upon what information and what probable cause? Well, there was a murder in the neighborhood and the defendant stood convicted at some previous date, years before, of a crime, not a violent crime. When I say violent, not raising to a category of murder. Well, not only he stood a convicted felon in the neighborhood, but also, we must go one step further, he was the last one seen with, in fact, the victim.

That would be fine for the State's Attorneys to argue at this particular time, if that was true, and that does not only come from the mouth of the defendant, in our case in chief, but from the mouth of the State's own witnesses and from the Chicago Police Department. Because, quite frankly, I would point out to the Court that he was not the last one to see the victim alive, that her family members not only saw her alive, but the following day, after this young girl, who has been shown that she was a runaway, who engaged in prostitution, who --

MS. MALLO: Objection.

MS. PLACEK: Judge, that was the testimony of the

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police officer.

THE COURT: Overruled.

MS. PLACEK: From the Court's --

THE COURT: Don't argue with Counsel. Address your remarks to me.

MS. PLACEK: I apologize, your Honor.

That she engaged in prostitution; that, in fact, she was habitually uncontrollable; that she had another male relative in the area who, in fact, lied to her legal guardian, not only lied to her legal guardian, but would take her in; that she was seen in the neighborhood and that she was seen in the neighborhood several days after she had run away. Not only that, but that the police believed this report and took her guardian and went out looking for her in a well-known strip.

Now, this was some time after, so there goes their claim that he was, in fact, the last one to see this person alive. So where is your probable cause? I don't know. I don't have to know. Where is your mere suspicion? I don't know. My job is to present the Court with the motion.

Well, said the police officers, Defense Counsel is wrong, we didn't arrest him when we came to

this house. Doesn't matter. It doesn't matter that it seemed like an arrest. It doesn't matter that we stand uncontradicted that he was taken out and hand-cuffed. He consentually came with us. No, says the State, the arrest happens later, later, when we had probable cause.

Well, Judge, I would ask the Court, if it needs transcripts. The transcribed testimony has been, in fact, prepared and can be given to you.

Other than the two facts, the facts mentioned, what other probable cause have they presented for a later arrest at the station? There is none.

So, Judge, under Payton and the prodigies, under all case law, they have shown no exigent circumstances, no probable cause which, quite frankly, was admitted by the State's Attorney at the first — at the time the Defense Counsel is claiming the arrest and saying, as a matter of fact, in argument with the Court, stated to this Court, well, Judge, there was no probable cause at that time. It wasn't until we got him down to the station and when we got him to the station, that's when we established probable cause. But all we have heard, time and time and time again, from the State] is the two things I brought up. Well, he was the

last known person, which is a lie and which is incorrect; and secondly, Judge, that he has been convicted before, something which cannot be used in Defense Counsel's estimation through case law. And then they said, well, when we got him to the station, we knew it, but there was no evidence presented as to how that evidence, which was nothing, had shifted.

For this reason, your Honor, we are asking the Court to, in fact, sustain our motion.

THE COURT: State.

### CLOSING ARGUMENT

# BY MS. MALLO:

Thank you, your Honor.

Judge, the People maintain that the defendant, strike that, that the detectives, the police department had probable cause for the arrest at the time they arrived at the defendant's home, but we also maintain, Judge, that the arrest didn't take place until the 9th day of August, they day after the defendant left his home and went to the police station, Judge.

THE COURT: After the defendant had voluntarily been in the police station for how long?

MS	MALLO:	Judge,	for	approximately	16	hours.
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Judge, I am going to rely on a case,
People versus Johnson, that can be cited at 187 II. App.
3d 756, and 554 -- 544 N.E. 2d 392.

THE COURT: Just give me the Illinois cite.

187 I1. App. 3d?

MS. MALLO: 756.

It's a 1989 case, Judge. I apologize to both you and Counsel, I thought I had copies for both of you. I do not. I will be more than happy to provide those to you.

### Judge --

THE COURT: I have them in chambers.

MS. MALLO: Thank you.

This is a First District, First Division case, and as I said, it was decided in June of 1989.

The Appellate Court addresses, in this case, the issue of arrest and in this case, specifically, at what time the arrest took place.

In this case, Judge, the defendant —
the police officer went to the defendant's home and
asked the defendant if, in fact, he would come to the
station. Unlike the case before your Honor, in the
Johnson case, the defendant — the police officers

were not invited into the home by the defendant. In Johnson, the police went to the home and similarities in the Johnson case and in the case before your Honor are these, that the Johnson case, as in the case before your Honor, the police never displayed a weapon. In the Johnson case, as in the case before your Honor, the squad car used to transport the defendant to the police station, there was no grill or no device separating the front seat from the back seat of that police car.

And, Judge, another similarity between these two cases is that neither situation was the defendant taken from his home in handcuffs. Judge, in the Johnson case, the defendant went to the police station with the police officers and the Court here focused on the intent of the police officers in the understanding of the individual being questioned.

Judge, I would ask you to consider here the fact that the testimony from the defendant, from his mother, from his sister, all was that the defendant himself called the police, that the defendant himself invited the police to his home and that the defendant's family member, a female, went to the door, opened the door and invited the police into the home of the defendant and his family. It was a consentual entry by

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the police.

The other thing I would ask you to consider, Judge, is whether other routine procedures associated with arrests were present, such as searching, booking, handcuffing, fingerprinting, and photographing.

Judge, I would ask you to consider the facts of the case before your Honor, that in this case, there is no evidence that the defendant was ever finger-printed, handcuffed, booked -- well --

MS. PLACEK: Objection.

MS. MALLO: There is a dispute to handcuffing. Excuse me, I misspoke.

There is no evidence that the defendant was ever fingerprinted, photographed, any booking process. Judge, the officers testified the defendant was taken from the home, smoking a cigarette, with his hands at his side. He opened the squad door by his own power, got in the back seat of that squad and was transported to the police station. At the police station, he was again allowed to sit in a room. When he walked from the squad into the police station, he was not handcuffed, he was free to walk in of how own accord, into the police station.

Judge, I would also ask you to consider

the facts of a recent decision. It's the decision that was a rule 23, from the Appellate Court, and I have copies of this for your Honor. I can also provide Counsel with one. And it is the case of the People versus Richard Crim. Judge, Crim cites two cases, People versus White and People versus Bean. I would ask you to consider the decision of the Appellate Court. It was appealed from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 85-C-7618, and the number given this case in the Appellate Court is 90-72. It was affirmed by the Appellate Court on February 13 of this year.

Judge, in the case of Crim, the police were admitted into Crim's house. Again, a difference between Crim and the case before your Honor is that Crim did not invite the police to his home. In this case, the police went to his home and, again, the police were given voluntary — were invited in, voluntary consent to enter, and when they were in there, they spoke with the defendant's family members. They were told that the defendant was asleep. They were told this by the defendant's father. And at that time, the police officers informed the father that they were there to talk to the defendant. The defendant got up, dressed himself, went into the living room. He met the defendants and,

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strike that, the detectives, and the detectives then transported him to Area 2 Headquarters.

In this case, the difference between the Crim case and the case before your Honor is the detectives, at that time, arrested the defendant inside his home. They handcuffed him and told him he was under arrest and transported him to Area 2.

Judge, I would say that those facts are different than the case before your Honor. And the Appellate Court held that even in the absence of exigent circumstances, voluntary consent to enter will justify a warrantless in-home arrest. Such consent need not be given by the defendant but may be, instead, obtained from a third party.

Judge, in the case before your Honor, the defendant invites the police into his home, calls the police, tells them to come over. When the police arrive, they meet with the defendant, allowed entry by a family member, and the defendant voluntarily goes with the police officers.

In this case before your Honor, there is no indicia of arrest, no handcuffs, no statement by the police, you are under arrest, as there was in the the Crim case, and, Judge, at that time, the defendant

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accompanies the officers to Area 2.

Judge, we argue the fact that there is probable cause, plus a consentual entry to this home, equals a legal, lawful arrest. That's just assuming arguendo that you do not agree with our position that the arrest took place on the 9th day of August, which is what we contend. The arrest took place the next day, after the defendant had already been taken to Area 2.

Judge, I ask you to consider other cases and, again, I apologize to both yourself and Counsel, I thought my file contained copies of these cases. It does not. And I would ask you to consider the case of People versus Creach, C-r-e-a-c-h. This case can be found at 79 I1. 2d 96. It's a 1980 case. It was a case decided by the Supreme Court of Illinois, in February of 1980.

Judge, in this case, it, like the case before your Honor, is a case involving a defendant charged with murder. In this case, the Supreme Court of Illinois considers as one of the issues, in rendering its decision, what probable cause was evident at the time the defendant was taken into custody.

Judge, the facts of Creach were as

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follows: The defendant was charged with murder of a woman whose body was found approximately 7:00 A.M., on the morning of September 25, 1973. He body was found near some CTA tracks in Evanston, and the victim died as a result of stab wounds and a gunshot wound.

The defendants had an initial conversation with the police, at which time they were not arrested, and the defendants were arrested at a later time, when probable cause existed. What happened is Creach left the jurisdiction of the State of Illinois. He fled and was in another part of the country. At the time the defendant was taken into custody, however, the officers knew that the defendant had been living off and on with the victim, that the victim was killed, most likely killed after midnight on the date of September 25, and also, Judge, that the last person the victim was seen with -- well, strike that, Judge, I'm sorry, that the defendant last saw the victim at 1:30 A.M., on the date of Septembner 25, and that the victim's body was found about five and a half hours later. The last, the fourth piece of probable cause the officers had was that the defendant left for Ohio in the victim's car.

The Supreme Court of Illinois held that

that was sufficient probable cause for the defendant's arrest. They reasoned that the victim's body was dry. It had rained that night and it was dry, so that most likely, she had been murdered after midnight. That he said in a conversation to his mother, which was reported to the police, that he had seen the victim about 1:30 A.M. Also, his mother knew that the victim, knew that her son was, on and off, living with the victim and also, Judge, knew that the defendant was driving the victim's car, knew that because the defendant called her from Ohio and told her. When he talked to his mother from Ohio, she asked the defendant to come home to Illinois to talk to the police. The defendant did. He contacted the police and the defendant was arrested for the murder of the victim.

Judge, I would ask you to consider the language of the Supreme Court in deciding the Creach case. When the Supreme Court decided that probable cause existed for the arrest of the defendant in this case, they said that probable cause for arrest exists when the facts and circumstances, within the arresting officer's knowledge, are sufficient to warn a man of reasonable caution in believing that an offense has been committed and that the person who has been arrested is

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the one who's committed it.

Judge, I would also ask you to consider another case and this case is People versus Fetterman, F-e-t-t-e-r-m-a-n, 14 II. App. 3d 120. Judge, this is a 1973 case decided by the Appellate Court of the Illinois First District, Third Division. It was decided in August of that year.

And, Judge, I think that the reason I find this case persuasive is because in the Fetterman case, the probable cause that the Appellate Court outlined as sufficient for this arrest of the defendant, I think there are very many similarities between the Fetterman case and the case before your Honor. What happened in this case is that a woman and her infant child were found dead in their apartment. The woman's hands and feet were bound and she was naked from the waist down. The woman and child had been home alone. The husband had left for work in the morning and when he returned from work that afternoon, he found his wife and his child dead in their apartment.

The defendant, at the time, Fetterman, worked for Peter Pan studios and, at that time, went into homes of people to take photographs of their children, baby pictures or children's pictures.

When the husband found the bodies of his wife and child, the only thing that was different in the home was that there was a receipt in their home from the Peter Pan studios, a receipt that had not been there that morning. The husband did not have any reason to believe there would be a delivery from Peter Pan, but a neighbor said she saw that Mrs., the woman in this case, had had her child's picture taken about a month and a half before and that Mrs. Carella had expected to get the pictures, she didn't know when, but knew she expected to get the proofs of these pictures.

When the police officers arrested the defendant in this case, they knew that they were looking for — they had reason to believe they were looking for someone who would have been a sex offender. The reason for this was that the victim's hands and feet were bound and that the victim, Mrs. Carella, was found naked from the waist down. They also knew that this person,

Fetterman, as I have already informed the Court, had been in the home, in Carella's home, about one month before the murders and they knew that he was — had been the person who had worked for Peter Pan, would have come in and taken the Carella baby pictures.

Also, Judge, the entry to the apartment

was not forced. There was an inference the police drew from that, that the person who had come into the apartment and committed the murder was someone known to Mrs. Carella. And as I said, she was expecting these baby pictures to be delivered. No one knew what date.

and the other thing the police relied upon was that there was pools of blood in the apartment and that the defendant must have had blood on his clothing from after committing these murders.

Judge, what I would ask you to consider is that they didn't have a name or all they had was this receipt for Peter Pan studios. No photos, was it ever mentioned in the transcript or this reporting in the Appellate Case Reporter that there was any photos there. The only thing they had was that one receipt from Peter Pan Studios, but they did know, Judge, that the person who probably committed this murder was a known sex offender and Fetterman was on parole at the time of these murders, for a sex offense he had committed. He had gone to the penitentiary for rape and was on parole for rape when this murder, these murders I should say, were committed.

Judge, in the --

THE COURT: Does that mean, Ms. Mallo, that anyone

who	has	a	prior	conviction	for	a	sex	offense	could
have	e bee	∍n	arrest	ted?					

MS. MALLO: No. I'm not suggesting that. I'm suggesting that as other pieces of the puzzle go, to establish the probable cause.

And Judge, I am going to ask you now to consider the probable cause in the case before your Honor. That what the police officers was investigating was the murder of a 12-year-old girl, a 12-year-old female. There was ligature marks around the neck. Her body was found in an abandoned garage. The structure was next-door to the defendant's home. Carolina McCoy said that she last saw the victim with the defendant. Yolanda Hill gave the police the same story, that she last saw the victim with the defendant. Paula Townsend said that she heard the defendant say is that okay and the victim responded yes. Paula Townsend said that she saw the victim — the last time she saw the victim, the victim was walking toward the defendant's house.

MS. PLACEK: Objection, Judge, incorrect testimony.

THE COURT: The police knew that the defendant was not the last person to see the victim alive, did they not?

MS. MALLO: Judge, the evidence -- what they had

was an anonymous tip. The people they talked to said the last person they saw the victim with was the defendant, Paula Townsend, Yolanda Hill.

THE COURT: But they had other evidence that that was not accurate information, did they not?

MS. MALLO: Judge, the police that testified said that when they talked to those people, that's the information they had.

THE COURT: The information they had was that the defendant was the last person to be seen with the victim, but they also had information that that was not accurate, didn't they?

MS. MALLO: Judge, they had an anonymous tip that someone had seen the victim on August 2. They talked to those other three people who said they had last seen her on August 1, with the defendant.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

Ms. MALLO: Judge, also consider the fact that the police, while investigating this, ran a background check of the defendant and they learned that the defendant was a convicted sex offender, that he was on parole for that offense, that he had that offense, that offense was that he had raped a 15-year-old female, that there was a choking incident involved in that rape.

	MS	5.	PLACEK:	Oł	ojeo	ction	. That	's a	misstat	teme	ent
of	the	te	estimony	as	it	lies	before	the	Court,	as	to
wha	at th	ney	knew,	Judo	qе.						

THE COURT: I will resolve any differences that you lawyers have, in regard to what the evidence shows. This is argument. This is her conception of what the evidence shows. I'll resolve it.

The objection is overruled.

MS. MALLO: Also, the evidence is the defendant was arrested for sexual assault on another young girl, a 13-year-old girl, and that sexual assault happened at 255 East 117th Street.

MS. PLACEK: Excuse me, I have to object. That was Mr. Ronkowski's testimony, not the officer's testimony.

MR. RONKOWSKI: I didn't testify in this case.

MS. PLACEK: That was what he was attempting to bring in through a rap sheet.

THE COURT: The objection is overruled. I will resolve that, Ms. Placek.

MS. MALLO: Judge, as I stated, the defendant lived next-door to the structure, to this garage, where the body of the victim was found, and the victim's there, were ligature marks around the victim's neck,

her hands were tied behind her back.

And I would ask you also to consider that James Hill told the police that the defendant had told him three different versions of the defendant's seeing the victim.

MS. PLACEK: Objection, Judge. That was never allowed into evidence. That's a misstatement.

THE COURT: The objection is overruled.

MS. MALLO: Judge, James Hill stated that the defendant had said, first of all, that he had never seen the victim, that he had also told James Hill that the defendant saw the victim walking down the street, and the third thing the defendant told James Hill was that the defendant saw the victim talking to Mr. Chu.

Judge, the defendant, his background check revealed that he was a sex offender, that he had committed a rape, that he had served time for that rape and he was on parole. The body was found next-door to the defendant's home. Three people told the police that the last person they saw the victim with was the defendant, and the defendant gave these conflicting stories to James Hill.

Judge, the evidence is clear that the police were invited into the defendant's home. There

was a consensual entry and that consensual entry, coupled with the probable cause, is a basis for the arrest.

Judge, I would also ask you, and this,

I have a copy for you and Counsel, of a decision

recently rendered by the Supreme Court of the United

States, and it is the case of People, or strike that -
New York is the petitioner.

THE COURT: I have a copy of that. New York versus Harris. Mr. Ronkowski was kind enough to provide me with a copy, yesterday, of it.

MR. RONKOWSKI: On a different case.

THE COURT: On a different matter.

MS. MALLO: In this case, the Supreme Court held where the police have probable cause to arrest a suspect, the exclusionary rule does not bar the State's use of a statement made by the defendant, outside his home, even though the statement was taken after arrest made in the home, in violation of Payton.

Judge, that holding, I know that we haven't discussed a statement, I know we haven't discussed anything along those lines, but I think the analogy, I think an analogy can be made. The Supreme Court talks about the integrity of Payton and what the

Payton decision was set down to protect, the integrity of the defendant's home.

Judge, I argue that here, there was no violation of Payton. The defendant's home was not violated. The police were invited into the home of the defendant. The defendant called the police, invited them into his home. When the police got there, the door was opened. The door was opened and the police were allowed in.

And, Judge, I would ask you to rely on that, to determine that, yes, there was a consentual entry. It is also maintained that there is sufficient probable cause, coupled with that consentual entry, to establish the lawful arrest and, Judge, we still maintain our position that arrest did not take place until the 9th of August.

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Ms. Placek.

## CLOSING ARGUMENT

#### BY MS. PLACEK:

Judge, both Crim and Fetterman, when the Court reads those cases more closely, will see they deal with exclusitivity. In other words, essentially,

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what the card in Crim -- the Peter Pan card in Fetterman dealt with the fact that they speak of a pointing finger almost, Judge, as to probable cause. Now, in this particular case, we don't even have a pointing finger. We don't even have an accurate time of death. And when I say we don't have an accurate time of death, if the Court will remember the original testimony of Detective Nitsche, Detective Nitsche said that when he started out this investigation and when, in fact, the body was found, he wasn't even sure, number one, he identified it as a female by the clothing; number two, he not only identified it as a female by the clothing, but he said he couldn't even tell, necessarily, who it was.

That's another thing that whittles away about exclusitivity. There is absurdity for the State to stand here and argue that this is the last person who saw the victim alive because, quite frankly, even if you forget about the impugned knowledge that she was seen days, not one day, but at least two days later, on the strip, the simplicity is that the people she talked to and argued with were the last people who even in the statement, closest to the State, saw her alive. quardian speaks of the fact that it was until about a half an hour to an hour, and that's from the State's case,

that she left not in the direction or going to the defendant's home, for there is no statement, other than a leap of imagination, but she wasn't down the street in a direction, in an easterly direction, and I think if the Court will read the transcript, that's what will be born out, after an argument.

As a matter of fact, quite frankly,

Judge, the statements that the State speaks of, were

taken no as a part of any kind of impugned knowledge of
a murder investigation, but as a missing person's

report, because, quite frankly, the victim's guardian
gave several males; one, I already touched on, Judge,
as a possible way, and the police questioned the

defendant when this was a missing persons and dismissed

it, and held it not reliable.

Next, where is the probable cause? Well, the defendant has a conviction. I would point out that what, essentially, the testimony of Nitsche, not as clear-cut as an after-trial preparation of a State's Attorney who tries to get certain evidence in a case, because if the Court remembers, all the detectives testified that they never went back, everything was handled by telephone, about this conviction. Therefore, Judge, the idea of some sort of mirror image crime is

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absurd and never, in fact -- well, let me put it this way, it's the same fertile imagination and whiff of smoke that the crowd came from, because that also is never contained within the pertinent summary prepared by the Chicago Police Department and if the Court reads the transcript as such.

Next, what the State doesn't mention is both Crim and -- Crim especially speaks of timing and when I speak of timing, the bodies were immediately found, a placement of a cause of death, a placement of the last person, the pointing finger.

In this instance, Judge, we have no time of death originated, we have no probable cause continued. Even under the report whittling away of Payton by the United States Supreme Court, what, essentially, we have is we have a defendant making statements, inculpatory, after an arrest. Where is the evidence that we have of this in this case, Judge? Not only that, but also, Judge, in the other case that the State cited in Fetterman, the consent was ruled to that the defendant willingly went with the police officers. They spoke of certain things as being inditia of arrest, but interestingly forgotten by the Assistant State's Attorney is that they also saw the Miranda Warnings as

an incident of arrest and they also saw the name and the taking of certain vital information from the defendant, at the station, as part of arrest. You have the Mirandizing of the defendant, testified by Detective Nitsche, and you have the age, the date of birth, the full name, and the address of the defendant, taken from] him when he is at the station. What more do you need for booking information?

It may not quack -- strike that. It may not be called a duck, but if it walks, if it waddles, and if it quacks, it sure is a duck.

Next, the State says well, Judge, look at all these cases, when people consensually came down to the station and then, essentially, the probable cause was established and an arrest was had. Read the cases the State cites. And the one thing you will hear in every one of the cases and the one phrase that will be continually mentioned is the police continued their ongoing investigation.

The State said that they disagree with Defense Counsel, with, in fact, the arrest took place at home. Fine. Then show me, excuse me, they should show you were, in fact, the police, even after questioning this young man or where, in fact, the State's

Attorneys presented any evidence that was any more than the evidence they had when they came to the home. If they are conceding or if they are stating, well, no we didn't have enough to arrest him at the house, then, quite frankly, where did their case get any better.

Next, if all this information does, in fact, constitute probable cause and since no exigency was shown, where was their warrant, which is still required without a show of exigency? Quite frankly, there is no contest that, in fact, the defendant called the police, under the subterfuge of they wanted to talk to him in his house. He never consented to go with them. Therefore, since they knew they had a ready, willing, and able subject waiting for them at the house, who was cooperating and supposedly, in the words of Officer Nitsche in the transcript, when I asked him, well, when you were at the house, would you have let him go, he said no, then what more do you need for an arrest and why didn't they take that fact to a warrant.

The Courts have ruled that what is in the mind of the police at the time of custody is important. Let's see what was in their mind and let's deal with their credibility.

The State makes much, well, our case was

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bolstered by the fact that the defendant, his sister and himself -- well, Judge, if we were to lie in this case, if we want to somehow fictionalize the true account of it, the easiest thing we would have had is we would have had the police kicking the door, pushing it in with their shoulder and saying this is a raid, you are under arrest. But instead, you have three people who go up and didn't lie. They could have made the police out some sort of devils who came and snapped the defendant's neck back and beat him and forced him, with his arms twisted behind him, to go. But they didn't, because they told you what happened.

Now, what do we have on credibility on the other side? We have a fictionalized crowd, we have Miranda, not free for you to go, but still not under arrest, we have officers stumbling back and forth on their testimony as to who goes in the house, who doesn't go in the house, how their progress is impeded by this The plainclothesmen do go in, they don't step in the house, they do go in. Judge, for professional observers, you would have imagined they would have got their stories straight. And then what do you have? At that point in time, you have a cease of an investigation.

So quite frankly, Judge, in answer to the

State's	argumen	nt in	our	final	rebut	tal	, q	uite	fr	ankly,
if they	didn't	have	prob	able	cause	at	the	hou	ıse,	they
sure did	dn't do	any m	ore	inves	tigati	ion	to	get	it	later.

For these reasons, Judge, we are again asking the Court to sustain our motion.

THE COURT: Ms. Placek, if you have the transcripts, I would be delighted to have them.

MS. PLACEK: I have them in my office. I believe the State also has their copy.

THE COURT: I am not prepared to rule on this motion, but I do want to make some observations about it.

As I understand it, it is the position of the police officers that they went to Mr. Hendricks' home, in response to his telephone call, and when he arrived — when they arrived there, he consented to go to the police station with them, either to discuss this matter and thereby prove his innocence or out of fear of this huge crowd that the police say was gathered out in front of his home. And when he arrived at the police station, he agreed to remain there for 16 hours.

And I must tell you that I find that position to be absolutely preposterous. I find it to be preposterous because it is inconceivable to me that

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a raging mob, as I understood it to be described to me, would be out in front of this man's house, because he is, according to the police, the subject matter of an investigation of what could only be described as a heinous crime and the neighbors are aware of it and they are obviously there, as I understood it, to be threatening this defendant and perhaps other members of his family. In order to give him the protection that he so rightfully deserves for his life and his bodily safety, they take him into custody, contrary to the obligations that they would have as police officers to arrest the persons that are creating the disturbance, to disburse the crowd, and to protect those who may be endangered after they leave.

But at the very least, at the very least, you would expect to find at least a scintilla that relates to that event in the police reports. And to suggest to me that it does not appear there because the police reports are mere summaries of the events is to ask me to divorce myself from all of the experience, all of the training, all of the education that I have had and to become the proverbial ostrich, with his head in the sand, and I am not so naive. I disbelieve it in its totality, and the testimony of James Hill forces me, even more so,

to disbelieve it, rather than to corroborate the police, in my judgement. When I listen to his testimony, along with theirs, I believe it even less. I believe that this defendant was arrested inside of his home, handcuffed, and taken out of his home and taken to a police facility, under arrest, and required to remain there in excess of 16 hours.

Now the consequences of that may be something altogether different, but to suggest to me that that didn't happen, under the evidence that is before me, seems to me, to ask me to just completely abandon reasoning.

When the police arrived there, to be sure, they were invitees. The defendant does not contend otherwise and I have no reason to doubt that that's precisely the posture in which they arrived there, and I don't have any doubt either that they were admitted voluntarily into the home. They were admitted there obstensibly, for the purposes of talking to the defendant and, normally, when we talk about consentual waiver of constitutional rights, the parameters of the consent dictate what can be done by the police, absent process. Whether it's true when we talk about Payton or not, I am not certain, but, normally, the police can

go no further than the consent which was extended to them, and the consent in this instance, as it's testified to both by the police, as I understand it, and the inferences to be drawn from their testimony and the defendant's, that the police were at his home, they left a card, they said they wanted to talk with him, he called them up and invited them to his home to talk, and that was the reason that they were admitted into his home.

Now, whether that can, after having gained admittance into his home, the police could then arrest him, without violating Payton, I need not, at this point, decide. I will, during the course of the decision of this case, because I am not altogether sure of what means in terms of whether the law will permit that kind of consentual entry into the man's home and then convert it into a full blown arrest.

But in any event, if they could arrest him there or anyplace else, that arrest had to be predicated on probable cause, and I have not read the case that Ms. Mallo has cited to me, I intend to do that perhaps tomorrow or as soon thereafter as is reasonably possible, to determine whether, upon the sparsity of the evidence that they had in this case, the police had probable cause to arrest this defendant.

If they did not, then it would seem to me that whether
or not there was a Payton violation, that is the unlawful
entry into his home, is sufficient, in and of itself,
to suppress the arrest, without probable cause, would
be in spite of New York versus Harris, in spite of
New York versus Harris, because New York versus Harris
was an arrest predicated on probable cause, followed by
the giving of Miranda at a police facility, which is
wholly different from an arrest without probable cause
followed by a Payton violation, followed by Miranda
Warnings.

And so those are the issues which are both factual and legal, that I intend to resolve.

Ms. Placek, when -- do you have the transcripts, Mr. Ronkowski?

MR. RONKOWSKI: Yes, I have the transcript of the defendant and Detective Nitsche here.

MS. PLACEK: I believe you have all of them.

MR. RONKOWSKI: The transcript of Mr. Hill and Detective Baker.

THE COURT: Mr. Ronkowski, I don't need Mr. Hill's testimony. I took very good notes. I've listened carefully. I remember him well and I reject his testimony.

MS. Placek: With all due respect, I believe

Mr.	Hill'	s testimony	has	the	po]	lice	of	fice	er's	; te	estimo	ny
	MR.	RONKOWSKI:	If y	yo wa	ant	me	to	rip	it	in	half.	

THE COURT: No. I thought you had it as separate but I'll take it. I don't have to read it. I already know it.

MS. PLACEK: I believe there are two days of testimony and today.

THE COURT: I don't need today's.

MS. MALLO: There would be testimony from February 27 of this year and there would be testimony from March 29 of this year.

MS. PLACEK: That would be two transcripts, Judge.

MR. RONKOWSKI: I have those two transcripts.

THE COURT: Now, in the interim, if you care to bring to my attention any additional authorities, I want them.

MS. PLACEK: The setting of limitations?

THE COURT: I'm sorry?

MS. PLACEK: The setting of limitations of issues as established by the Court, Judge, and we still haven't received the Court's cases. What I would suggest, quite frankly, is something akin to a briefing schedule. I can talk to my co-counsel and have him directly give cases

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both to yourself, but I suggest we have a cutoff point, perhaps Monday of next week, to submit cases to the Court on the issues, as established by the Court.

THE COURT: Well, that would certainly be helpful to me. I don't know that I am going -- you know, well, let me suggest to you the cases, as I understood them, the factual scenarios that I understood Ms. Mallo to give to me insofar as Fetterman and Creach were concerned, and Johnson, I don't think you went into the facts of any great extent, but those two cases do not seem to be or seem to be my mind at this point, at any rate, to be factually distinguishable. But Peter Pan, Peter whatever is was, receipt, in one instance, the defendant being in Ohio with the victim's car, within a relatively short time after she is dead, and those kinds of things are much, much different from this case.

is the police awareness that the victim was found next-door to where the defendant lives. The defendant had a prior conviction for some sort of sex crime. And there is a conflict as to whether or not the police knew whether the defendant was the last person to see her alive and where the police are in possession of that kind of conflicting information as to who it was

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that the victim was last with, whether they can ignore that and hold up that portion of it, which affords them probable cause and disregard and reject all of the evidence that suggests that there might be some reason to go slower, I'm not certain, but the concept, as enunciated by Ms. Mallo, as enunciated by the Supreme Court, is that probable cause is that degree of cause which would cause a reasonably careful and prudent person and a reasonably careful and prudent person would take into consideration, it would seem to me, the fact that his information that he is relying upon is conflicting and to do something to straighten out that conflict, rather than to simply say I have probable cause and disregard everything that suggests you do not. again, that's something else that I am going to have to resolve and I don't know how that's going to come down, but we shall see.

In any event, Mr. Ronkowski, what is your suggestion about a briefing schedule that would, if you choose to do so, I am not ordering you to do that, it would be helpful to have a full expression of your views and the views of the Defense in this case, to the fullest extent that you care to exercise your right to do that, or exercise your option to do it.

1	MR. RONKOWSKI: In a motion like this, the
2	burden is with the defendant. If they want to submit
3	a brief, we'll submit something in response.
4	MS. PLACEK: Judge, that's fine if we I am not
5	going to get involved in who's got the burden of proof.
6	If you want to submit simultaneous briefs on this issue,
7	I will receive them. If you don't, that's fine.
8	THE COURT: I will receive whatever is submitted
9	to me and if it's not submitted to me, that's fine.
10	MS. PLACEK: May I suggest the Court set a deadline
11	date.
12	THE COURT: June 8.
13	I'm not going to put the case on the
14	call.
15	MR. RONKOWSKI: What date does the Court wish?
16	THE COURT: I'm thinking about June 29, or some
16 17	THE COURT: I'm thinking about June 29, or some time during the week of June 25, whichever is more
17	time during the week of June 25, whichever is more
17 18	time during the week of June 25, whichever is more convenient to you.
17 18 19	time during the week of June 25, whichever is more convenient to you.  MS. PLACEK: How about the 27th of June, Judge?
17 18 19 20	time during the week of June 25, whichever is more convenient to you.  MS. PLACEK: How about the 27th of June, Judge?  THE COURT: That's fine.
17 18 19 20 21	time during the week of June 25, whichever is more convenient to you.  MS. PLACEK: How about the 27th of June, Judge?  THE COURT: That's fine.  MS. PLACEK: Thank you, Judge.

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STATE OF ILLINOIS )
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     COUNTY OF C O O K )
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          IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS
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               COUNTY DEPARTMENT-CRIMINAL DIVISION
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     THE PEOPLE OF THE
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     STATE OF ILLINOIS
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                               ) No. 88 CR 12517
           -vs-
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     JEROME HENDRICKS
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                REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS had of the hearing
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     of the above-entitled cause, before the Honorable
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     LEO E. HOLT, Judge of said court, on the 27th day
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     of June, A. D. 1990.
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          APPEARANCES:
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                HON. CECIL A. PARTEE,
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                   State's Attorney of Cook County, by:
                MR. DOUGLAS SIMPSON and
15
                MS. NANCY COLLETTI,
                   Assistant State's Attorneys,
16
                appeared on behalf of the People;
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                HON. RANDOLPH N. STONE,
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                   Public Defender of Cook County, by:
                MS. MARIJANE PLACEK,
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                   Assistant Public Defender,
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               appeared on behalf of the Defendant.
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THE CLERK: Sheet 1, Line 10, Jerome Hendricks in custody.

THE COURT: Mr. Simpson?

MR. SIMPSON: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: I have some of your transcripts. There might be a third one. I'm not sure. I'll have to look in my briefcase, or either I may have left one at home.

MR. SIMPSON: Fine.

THE COURT: The matter of Jerome Hendricks is before the Court for ruling on the Defendant's Motion to Quash his Arrest and Suppress certain statements made by the defendant.

I have read the Defendant's Motion, and I have read the transcript of the hearing on his Motion to Suppress.

that I believe that the defendant was arrested at his home in violation of Peyton versus New York. I reach that conclusion for several reasons, one of which may not be accurate, but it is, in my judgment, more probably than not the law, although I concede very readily that there might be some authority to the contrary, and I concede further that the way in

which the law is developing, my concept in this regard may be flawed.

There isn't any question but that the police officers who entered the defendant's home were admitted into his home voluntarily. And to that extent, Peyton versus New York may be inapplicable. On the other hand, the evidence in the case demonstrates to me that the consentual admission of the police officers into the defendant's home was for the purposes of having a conversation, it appearing from the evidence in the case that the police had left a message at the defendant's home that they wished to converse with him.

And upon receiving that message, the defendant telephoned the police station and informed the police that he was willing to have a conversation with them.

Now, the general rule of law is that the law abhors a waiver of constitutional rights, and a consentual waiver restricts the police authorities to the reasonable extent of the consent, that is, the police cannot generally go beyond that which has been consented to and still be within the consentual agreement of the parties. Whether that concept is

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applicable to Peyton, I'm not altogether sure.

I reject the testimony of the police that
the defendant accompanied them to the police station
in order to be free from the potential threat of a
mob that had allegedly gathered in front of his house.
And I reject that because I do not think the factual
basis supports it, nor do I think that the police
believed at the time that the defendant was transported
to the police facility that that was the basis for
their transporting him.

I come to that conclusion because nowhere in any police report is there any indication at all that there was, one, a mob in front of the defendant's home, or that the defendant requested or agreed to be taken from his home to a police facility because of the mob, or that the police themselves, being fearful for the defendant, transported him to a police facility for his own safety.

There is a proposition of law that, in essence, says that the failure to recite that which would have been recited under normal circumstances amounts to an affirmative assertion to the contrary. And it is inconceivable and inexplicable that if a mob that had, in fact, attacked the defendant while

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he was with police officials, and they had to scurry him away for his safety and for theirs, it is inexplicable to me that that would not have appeared in some police recordation of that event. And so I reject it as being a fact.

I haven't said that a Peyton violation took It appears to me that it is of no consequence at all. It is of no consequence that the police violated the consentual entry into his home, and it is of no consequence that they took him from his home under arrest without benefit of a warrant because under the holding of New York versus Harris, which is applicable to this case, the Peyton violation, whether it was a violation as a result of their entry into his home by consent or whether or not it was the classic Peyton violation of non consentual entry into the defendant's home for the purposes of arresting him, New York versus Harris teaches that rightly or wrongly -- and I might suggest from my point of view, wrongly, but my point of view is as relevant as anything that I do imagine being since I think I fully understand the holding in New York versus Harris, whether I agree with it or not, I'm obliged to apply it -- and Harris teaches us that the only

violation that could result would be the unlawful entry into the defendant's home, but that did not make his arrest unlawful if there was probable cause.

And the only thing that would be suppressable as a consequence of the violation of Peyton would be those statements made by the defendant while in the confines of his home and/or physical evidence seized from him while in the confines of his home.

And since neither of those are present in this case, the violation of Peyton is not relevant.

And I must determine whether or not there was probable cause for the defendant's arrest.

If there was probable cause for the defendant's arrest, then the statements taken from him in the police facility are not subject to being suppressed. Conversely, if there was no probable cause, then the defendant was at the police facility in violation of his 4th Amendment rights, and the holding of Dunaway versus New York and Brown versus Illinois and cases -- and its progeny would be applicable to this defendant's Motion.

In determining whether or not there was probable cause to arrest the defendant, scrutinized the record in this case to determine whether or not

a reasonably prudent person operating under the same circumstances and factual bases that the police were operating from reasonably believed that a crime had been committed and the defendant committed it.

The evidence which supports that, if it does, need not be of the quality that would support a conviction. It may not necessarily rise to the level where a preliminary hearing Judge would find probable cause to bind the defendant over for trial. It must simply be that level of cause that would require a reasonably prudent police officer to operate. That the police officers had reasonable grounds to believe that a crime had been committed can hardly be done.

The other aspect of it is whether or not there was enough information for them to believe that the defendant committed the offense. In that regard, the evidence indicates that the victim was found dead in a garage next to the defendant's home, that some five or six days earlier, maybe as much as seven days earlier, the defendant and the victim were seen in conversation with one another with some degree of family opposition to the defendant conversing and having some level of communication or contact with the

underaged victim.

that the defendant's prior criminal background which disclosed a number of criminal offenses similar in nature, that is to say, that the defendant had been involved with young girls in a criminally sexual manner on one or more occasions. The defendant, also insofar as the police were aware was, if not the last person to be seen with the victim, he was certainly well within their knowledge of being one of the last persons.

There is some evidence in this record that the victim was seen alive after August 1, the last day that the record indicates that this defendant saw her.

Taking all of the information that the police officers had together, not any one of which in and of itself perhaps being sufficient, but in the totality of the circumstances, it can reasonably be said that the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant for the offense which they had under investigation.

Thus, the Court finds that his presence in the police facility was not in violation of his

4th Amendment rights, there is no 5th Amendment
contention before the Court. Therefore, I find that
the statements that the defendant made are not subject
to being suppressed, and the defendant's Motion to
Suppress is denied.

MS. PLACEK: Thank you for your consideration, your Honor.

May I suggest that there's certain motions in limine that need be filed, and I prefer filing some of them in writing in this matter.

May I suggest that a date be set for the filing of those motions.

THE COURT: I can give you a final status date on the third, tenth, seventeenth, or thirty-first of August.

MS. PLACEK: May I get my book?

THE COURT: Surely.

MS. PLACEK: The 3d of August would be fine, your Honor.

THE COURT: By agreement date?

MS. COLLETTI: Yes, Judge.

THE COURT: By agreement August 3, final status.

MS. PLACEK: Thank you, your Honor.

(Which were all the proceedings had.)

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STATE OF ILLINOIS )

CCUNTY OF C O O K )
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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY COUNTY DEPARTMENT-CRIMINAL DIVISION

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

V JEROME HENDRICKS No. 88 CR 12517

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS had in the above entitled cause, before the Honorable LEO E. HOLT, Judge of said court, on the 14th day of January, A.D., 1991.

## APPEARANCES:

HON. JACK O'MALLEY,
State's Attorney of Cook County, by
MR. JOHN MURPHY,
Assistant State's Attorney,
appeared for The People;

MR. RANDOLPH STONE,
Public Defender of Cook County, by
MS. MARIJANE PLACEK,
Assistant Public Defender,
appeared for The Defendant.

THE CLERK: Sheet 2, Line 16, Jerome Hendricks, in custody.

(Defendant Present)

THE COURT: All right.

MS. PLACEK: Good morning, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MS. PLACEK: Your Honor, for the record, Marijane Placek.

Judge, I called the State on Friday, and I have a viral infection in my head which some people might have said I've had for a long time and just not known it. Unfortunately, this one has taken the matter of rendering my hearing twenty percent for approximately—Well, it's been going on for two weeks.

I would be asking, since I don't feel that under this condition, because of health reasons, Mr. Hendricks' case, in fact, be continued for whatever date the Court would, in fact, be convenient. I'm supposed to be over this, according to my doctor, in approximately five days, and be restored to what is normal for me.

THE COURT: Miss Vrdolyak, do we have a case set for trial on the 22nd of January?

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THE CLERK: Yeah, you have a few benches
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    on the 22nd.
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              THE COURT: Is there a jury set?
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              THE CLERK: I don't see one. We have Virgil
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     Bass up.
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              THE COURT: That's all right.
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              THE CLERK: Probably the 23rd would be
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     better.
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              MR. MURPHY: Judge, we have a murder case set
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     for jury on the 28th on Frank Williams, I think.
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     that right, Deb?
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              THE CLERK: Yeah.
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              THE COURT: How long is it going to take to
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     try this case?
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              MS. PLACEK: I'm sorry, Judge?
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              THE COURT: How long will it take to try this
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     case, to the best --
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              MS. PLACEK: Ten days. I would expect about
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     ten working days, which will translate to two weeks. I
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     will clear my -- Since this case has been on this Court's
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     docket for so long, I'm clearing my schedule with the
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     other judges, so whatever date is convenient with the
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     Court.
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THE COURT: January 22nd.

MS. PLACEK: January 22nd?

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. PLACEK: Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: January 22nd. By agreement,

Mr. Murphy?

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MR. MURPHY: Yes, Judge.

THE COURT: By agreement.

MR. MURPHY: Judge, if I may? Counsel? There's two other matters, Judge.

I didn't know counsel would be here before lunch. I'm going to file two motions in this matter. I will run upstairs and get them. I will give them to counsel. It's a motion to amend our answer to discovery to include another case, or evidence of other crimes, and also our intention to proceed under the felony murder theory. I am advising the defense of that at this time.

MS.PLACEK: As of-- As with respect to both my client and this Court, that's the reason I'm here, I would ask counsel rather than-- If perhaps he could tender those to Mr. Lufrano, who is the Public Defender in this courtroom, who will be trying it with me, and he will make sure that I get that because I'd like to go home and get back into bed, Judge.

MR. MURPHY: Okay.

MS. PLACEK: And we will respond to those motions, if necessary, with a written response before the date set for trial, Judge.

THE COURT: There are two felony murder counts in your indictment.

MR. MURPHY: Yes, Judge. We are going to be asking is that we be allowed to proceed on that theory as to the other felony charges that are in the indictment as well, and in addition to the two that are charged.

MS. PLACEK: What I would suggest --

THE COURT: You are going to add additional felony murder counts?

MR. MURPHY: Not add. I think when the Court sees the motion and the cases cited, you will better understand. I don't believe they have to be charged in order for us to proceed under that theory.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. MURPHY: There's case law that supports that.

THE COURT: We'll take that up on the 22nd.

MS. PLACEK: Or if necessary, Judge, before,

and I will motion it up.

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THE COURT: Yeah, you can motion it up before at any time and provide me with any authorities that you choose, and I'll consider it at that time prior to trial.

MS. PLACEK: Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: All right.

(Whereupon the further proceedings in the above entitled cause were continued to January 22nd, 1991.) STATE OF ILLINOIS COUNTY OF COOK

above and foregoing to be a tru RECORD CONSISTING OF THE	nd State, and Keeper of t e, perfect and complete co REPORT OF PROCEEDIN	RELIA PUCINSKI, Clerk of the he Records and Seal thereof, do hopy of VOLUME TWO OF A SINGS, ONLY. NO PRAECIPE HAVI	hereby certify the IX VOLUME ING BEEN FILED
		E APPELLATE COURT UNDER AF	
95-0474.	,		• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
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		pending in sa	
The People of the State of Illin	oisWERE	.,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,	, Plaintiffs and
		Witness: AURELIA PU	CINSKI,
	Cl	erk of the court, and the Seal th	ereof, at Chicago
	In.	said County, 25	19 96
		Auselia Juene Clerk	
		CICIK	

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      STATE OF ILLINOIS
                             SS:
      COUNTY OF C O O K
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                 IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY
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                COUNTY DEPARTMENT-CRIMINAL DIVISION
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      THE PEOPLE OF THE
      STATE OF ILLINOIS
                             Indictment No. 88 CR 12517.
6
               ٧S
                             Charge: Murder, etc.
7
      JEROME HENDRICKS
8
                      REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS
 9
            BE IT REMEMBERED that this cause came on to be
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      heard the 4th day of February, A. D. 1991, before
11
      the Honorable LEO I. HOLT, Judge of said court.
12
13
            APPEARANCES:
14
                 HON. JACK O'MALLEY,
                    State's Attorney of Cook County, by
15
                 MR. MATTHEW COGHLAN,
                    Assistant State's Attorney,
16
                    appeared for the People;
17
                 MR. RANDOLPH N. STONE,
                 Public Defender of Cook County, by
18
                 MR. VINCENT LUFRANO,
                    Assistant Public Defender,
19
                     appeared for the defendant.
20
21
22
       J. P. S. Washington, CSR .
       Official Shorthand Reporter
23
       Circuit Court of Cook Couty
       Criminal Division
       2650 South California Avenue
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THE CLERK: Jerome Hendricks.

(Defendant present.)

MR. LUFRANO: Your Honor, I am standing in for Miss Placek; she just called and told my secretary that she was presently on trial before Judge Karnezis.

THE COURT: Order of court -- Strike that. Motion defendant, February 5th, with subpoenaes, for trial.

You tell Miss Placek that I am going to hold this case on call from day-to-day; if she commences another trial or is not in my courtroom the day after she completes her trial before Judge Karnezis, I am going to hold her in contempt of court. This case is going to trial and it is going to trial without any further delay.

You may also tell Miss Placek, and I will tell her if and when she comes into this courtroom, that I think this is a very sloppy, sloppy, unprofessional way to handle a man's capital case. I am thoroughly and absolutely disappointed with her. This case is going to trial.

I will so inform her, your MR. LUFRANO: 351

Honor. (Whereupon the proceedings in the above entitled cause were continued to the 5th day of February, A.D., 1991.) 

Document 17-11

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Case 1:08-cv-01589

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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE COOK JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
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                   COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS
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    THE PEOPLE OF THE
                             CASE NO. 88-CR-12517
    STATE OF ILLINOIS
5
                             CHARGE: Murder
         VERSUS
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     JEROME HENDRICKS
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8
               REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS had on
9
     the 5th day of February, A.D. 1991, before the
10
     Honorable LEO E. HOLT, Judge of said Court.
11
12
13
14
               HON. JACK O'MALLEY,
                   State's Attorney of Cook County, by
15
               MR. SCOTT CASSIDY, MR. JOHN MURPHY,
                   Assistant State's Attorneys
16
                   appeared for the People;
17
               MR. RANDOLPH STONE,
                   Public Defender of Cook County, by
18
               MS. MARIJANE PLACEK, MR. VINCENT LUFRAND
                   Assistant Public Defenders
19
                appeared on behalf of the Defendant
20
2 1
     SHIRLEY A. MITCHELL, C.S.R.,
     Official Court Reporter
     Markham, Il. 60426
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Case 1:08-cv-01589 Document 17-11

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THE CLERK: Jerome Hendricks.

THE COURT: You can amend more informal defects in this indictment, but not in such a way as to bring a new charge.

If this brings about a new charge, it changes the charge in this case; then, that's an impermissible amendment.

MS. PLACEK: We would ask the Court to make its ruling before the selection of the jury.

THE COURT: I don't know whether that's going to happen or not. But we will see.

It's not going to be of any great magnitude, it seems to me, if I don't get to it before the commencement of the jury selection.

But we will see.

What other sections of the indictment are we dealing with, Mr. --

MR. MURPHY: That's all I have, Judge.

THE COURT: Insofar as the other Counts are concerned, Counts 3 and 4, leave is granted to the State to amend Counts 3 and 4.

Anything else?

MS. PLACEK: At the last court date, Judge, the State, I believe, filed a motion which I

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received a copy of.

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I have several motions in limine, including a motion to dismiss. But irrespective of that, I don't know how in order the Court wishes to take that.

Also, in this matter, Judge, we have in answer to the Court's previously asked question -

THE COURT: Which question is that?

MS. PLACEK: Witherspoon.

THE COURT: What's the defense's position?

MS. PLACEK: We would prefer not Witherspooning at this time, Judge.

For the purpose of the record, we would suggest, and I believe that the Court heard by my predecessor several death penalty motions previous in this matter, and made rulings on same.

I believe in reading the transcript in preparation for this trial, there was an argument made by Mr. Gant, I believe, that a -- dealing with a Witherspoon jury. And this dealt with generally not Witherspooning irrespective of the decisions being made.

We would ask that the Court refuse to Witherspoon same jury.

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MR. MURPHY: It's my understanding, then, that the defense is asking that the jury not be Witherspooned, but the defendant is not going to execute any waiver at the time?

THE COURT: That's my understanding.

MR. MURPHY: Then, we would object.

We may have a jury that is not requested to make a determination as to capital sentence.

MS. PLACEK: We would suggest, Judge, as presented, I believe, in early arguments before by my predecessors, Mr. Lemons and Mr. Gant, that a Witherspoon jury is a guilt prone jury, statistics have shown same.

I would suggest that, pursuant to the Statute dealing with the death penalty, that, in fact, there is nothing precluding, if in fact, it's found that for some reason a scrupled juror is present on the 12, or in the alternative, there is not enough jurors to hear, if the guilty verdict is returned, as to the so-called death phase, that the Statute does not preclude the impaneling of a new juror, specifically and only for the purpose of hearing the death penalty.

THE COURT: I take it, Ms. Placek, for

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clarification, you're asking that I postpone Witherspooning until after the jury has deliberated on guilt/innocence.

MS. PLACEK: That's correct, Judge.

THE COURT: And should the jury return a verdict of guilty of first degree murder, then to Witherspoon the jury, if at all.

MS. PLACEK: That's correct, Judge.

We would suggest that a Witherspoon jury, in fact, puts an unfair burden on the defendant, not only from a previous study cited during the capital arguments not made by myself, but by other members of my office.

But also, Judge, because of the fact that it puts the jury in a guilt prone mood; that is, the punishment is already in issue before the evidence is, in fact, heard.

The State is allowed to take the position psychologically and in reality because of Witherspooning, that we are just going through the formality of the trial, and now what we essentially are dealing with is we are dealing with the punishment, if you will.

MR. MURPHY: Judge, if I may also indicate,

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have asked on numerous occasions since I have been in this courtroom what the defendant's position is, and I understand that is a difficult decision to make.

At no time were we ever aware that the defense ever intended to make this motion. And had we been given some case, we would have prepared an appropriate response.

At this particular time, I'm not aware of what the authorities are, because for the very first time, to my knowledge, this has come up.

And we have no response.

THE COURT: Well, I don't know that that's going to disadvantage you, because for many, many years I have taken the position that Miss Placek asserts. I think it's right.

And knowing nothing to the contrary, all of the psychological and socialogical studies, without a single study to the contrary, tends to come to the conclusion that the death qualified jury is also psychologically conviction prone, for a bunch of reasons. And the studies proliferate, in a sense.

And the opponents to that proposition

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have not published a single study that I am aware of to the contrary.

On the other hand, the fact that I am impathetic to that proposition is of no significant relevance, because the law is to the contrary.

The United States Supreme Court in the case of -- the case escapes me, the name of it -- but specifically rejected that approach, in my judgment, inappropriately.

It specifically rejected the validity of the studies without anything to the contrary being proffered to it on which it could reject those studies; nonetheless, it did, or at least if it didn't reject the conclusion of the study, certainly rejected their applicability insofar as it impenges upon the defendant's 8th Amendment Right.

And the Illinois Supreme Court has done likewise. And so, there is not a single case in Illinois that would support the proposition that the Court can avoid the consequenses of Witherspooning on the ground that it diminishes either the defendant's 14th Amendment Right, or his 8th

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Amendment Right.

And because the law is in that posture, I am not only unwilling, but I am barred from chartering new ground in that area.

If I were the sole determinate of this issue, and without any studies to the contrary, and given the number of studies that tend to support your position, the situation might be different.

But I am not out here free to pick and choose which Court decisions I will follow and which ones I will advocate.

So, on that basis, the defendant has a hard choice to make.

MS. PLACEK: With due respect to the Court, but anticipating the Court's answer in this matter, the only thing that I would point out to the Court is the Supreme Court -- and I'm speaking of the United States Supreme Court case -- that, in fact, spoke of the prohibition and the rejection of the so-called guilty prone studies in Witherspoon did not deal with a state that, in fact, dealt -- or where the Statute spoke of a two-point jury, as in our death penalty Statute.

I would point out, with due respect to the Court, that although the request for a so-to-speak double jury on the death phase, it becomes necessary, has been heard by the Illinois Supreme Court, I would suggest that this Court is hearing it in a different ground in that this Court is hearing it at a time never brought before the Illinois Supreme Court.

Basically, the case which the Court speaks of, those death penalty cases involving requests by Defense Counsel for a second jury based on the guilt prone decision, if you will, or the guilt studies and surveys dealing with the Witherspoon issue, deal when a guilty verdict has come back from a Witherspoon jury, and it's at that time Defense Counsel first makes a motion to have that jury disimpaneled, and, in fact, another jury seated.

I would suggest, and I would call the Court's special attention to that part of the Statute that does deal with death penalty and suggest that it neither says same jury, the jury who heard the evidence. It is still open.

Therefore, quite frankly, when the Court says that

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it's not in the position of charting new waters, the suggestion is, in fact, that the Court wouldn't be charting new waters, contrary to the case, but, in fact, going to the waters that have never been discovered.

THE COURT: Well, I think, to the contrary, that the law in Illinois in this regard is pretty well settled, that if the State elects to treat this matter as a capital offense, one which would make the defendant eligible for a capital sentencing hearing if found guilty of first degree murder, then, the jury is to be Witherspooned at the outset. And the only way to avoid that is by the defendant exercising, again, his pure right to waive a jury at sentencing hearing, which he has a right to do.

And I understand the difficulty with the choice, but your motion to bar or to postpone
Witherspoon is denied.

## MS. PLACEK: One thing:

In rereading the transcripts this weekend involving the motions that were had by previous Counsel, at the end of that motion, the Assistant State's Attorneys -- not these two

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gentlemen, but others -- in fact stated that at that time there was a likely possibility that, in fact, there would be a request made by the State, should a finding of guilty on first degree murder in the accompanying eligibility phase, that the State would in all probability ask for the death penalty.

To formalize the record, Judge, what I would be asking at this time is I would be asking for an affirmative statement by the State's Attorney.

THE COURT: Mr. Murphy.

MR. MURPHY: Judge, I thought it was very clear to the defendant.

But if it is not, we are treating this case as a capital case.

MS. PLACEK: That means there will be such a request at the end?

THE COURT: I don't know whether it means that or not.

It may very well be at the conclusion of the State's case, even with a finding of guilty, that the State may elect not to proceed to the capital sentencing.

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That is a prerogative up until -- at any point.

MS. PLACEK: You see, that's the problem I have with the Witherspooning issue, Judge.

THE COURT: We'll cross that at the appropriate time.

But you certainly don't want the State to be bound by its pre-trial determination that they'll seek the death penalty, and not be in a position to back away from that without having committed error. That would seem to me to be a rather peculiar position for the Defense to be in.

MS. PLACEK: The peculiarity of the defense's position, unless I get a firm affirmative, is the fact that, number one, in denying my previous motion, that, in fact, we have, so-to-speak, a bifurcated jury, one as to guilt or innocence, just for purposes of the record in clarity, and also as to the Witherspooning issue. And the State, so-to-speak, being able to have the ultimate decision after the case, I am forced to make the decision dealing with Witherspooning not fully -- not fully informed.

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